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 Costs – UCPR rr 681 and 684 - departing from general rule that costs follow the 
event – costs apportioned by trial judge – UCPR r 703 - indemnity costs awarded 
only in exceptional cases 
In BHP Coal Pty Ltd v K Orenstein & Koppel AG (No 2) [2009] QSC 64 McMurdo J 
considered the circumstances in which the ordinary rule under r 681 of the Uniform Civil 
Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR) that costs should follow the event should be 
departed from in favour of a party who was unsuccessful overall, but who succeeded on 
particular questions.  
Facts 
The litigation involved two claims, which McMurdo J had described when giving 
judgment ([2008] QSC 141), as the design case and the inspection case. All but the 
fourth plaintiff recovered substantial damages on each case. The total of the several 
awards on the design case was $34,065,992 (before interest), compared with an 
amount claimed of $50,166,920.  
The amount claimed on the inspection case was the same, with the successful plaintiffs 
being awarded $37,070,593 (before interest). In neither case was there any reduction of 
the damages for contributory negligence. 
The question of costs had been left for subsequent determination, and the parties had 
presented extensive written and oral submissions on the question, together with 
detailed analyses of the time said to have been taken on various issues in the course of 
the trial (which had occupied 92 days). 
Legislation 
Rule 681 of the UCPR provides: 
681.  (1)  Costs of a proceeding, including an application in a proceeding, are 
in the discretion of the court but follow the event, unless the court orders 
otherwise. 
  (2)  Subrule (1) applies unless these rules provide otherwise. 
 
Rule 684 of the UCPR provides: 
 
 684.  (1)   The court may make an order for costs in relation to a particular 
question in, or a particular part of, a proceeding. 
  (2)   For subrule (1), the court may declare what percentage of the costs 
of the proceeding is attributable to the question or part of the proceeding to which 
the order relates. 
 Submissions 
The plaintiffs sought orders that the successful plaintiffs recover their costs of the 
proceedings, with costs associated with certain issues to be on the indemnity basis. 
They also submitted there should be no order for costs in relation to the fourth plaintiff. 
They argued that a departure from the general rule expressed in r 681 should be made 
only where there are “special or exceptional circumstances.”  
 
A range of authorities was cited for this proposition, including the judgment of McHugh J 
(with whom Brennan CJ agreed) in Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 
92 at 96. The plaintiffs’ argument for some of the costs on the indemnity basis was on 
the grounds that the defendants’ conduct of the case was in some respects so 
unreasonable as to warrant that order. 
The defendants submitted that the plaintiffs should pay the defendants’ costs 
associated with the defence of certain parts of the case, on the basis that the conduct of 
the plaintiff was unreasonable in certain respects. They argued in the alternative that  
the amount of costs to be paid to the plaintiff be reduced overall by 50 per cent. The 
defendants argued that r 684 provides a wider discretion to depart from the general rule 
than was the case under previous rules or equivalents in other jurisdictions.  
Reference was made in this respect to the decision of Chesterman J in Todrell Pty Ltd v 
Finch [2008] 2 Qd R 95 at [13], where his Honour had noted the rule refers to “a 
particular question…or a particular part of, a proceeding”, whereas the previous rule 
referred to several “issues”, a term which had tended in some cases to confine the 
discretion. The defendants also submitted that no costs should be awarded on the 
indemnity basis.   
Analysis 
McMurdo J was satisfied it remained the general rule that costs should follow the event, 
and that r 684 provided an exception, requiring that there be something about the case 
which warranted a departure from the general rule. In his Honour’s view, this came not 
only from the terms of the rules themselves, but from the recognised purpose of the 
usual order as to costs. He noted this was consistent with views expressed by Einstein 
J in Mobile Innovations Ltd v Vodafone Pacific Ltd [2003] NSWSC 423 at [4], and 
approved by Chesterman J in Todrell Pty Ltd v Finch [2008] 2 Qd R 95.  
McMurdo J adhered to the view he had expressed in Australand Corporation (Qld) Pty 
Ltd v Johnson [2007] QSC 128 at [17] that ordinarily the fact that a successful plaintiff 
fails on particular issues does not mean that the plaintiff should be deprived of some of 
its costs, although it may be appropriate to award costs of a particular question or part 
of a proceeding where that matter is definable and severable and has occupied a 
significant part of the trial. 
McMurdo J then analysed the particular questions or parts of the litigation for which the 
defendants said that they should have the costs, or which warranted a reduction in the 
costs to be paid by them.  
These included a claim in both the design case and the inspection case, for an award of 
special damages on which the plaintiff failed entirely. Until fairly late in the case, the 
amount sought on this claim was about a quarter of the total claimed in the proceeding.  
His Honour found that this claim had not simply failed, but that it was “inevitably flawed 
quite apart from the outcome of the substantial factual contest it produced.” As it had 
occupied a significant part of the trial, his Honour was satisfied that there was a strong 
basis for departing from the general rule and reducing the costs otherwise recoverable 
by the plaintiffs accordingly.  
The judge considered that an apportionment of five per cent of the overall costs to this 
claim would accord with his view of the extent to which it probably increased the length 
of the trial. As he thought it was also reasonable to expect that the costs of each side on 
this question would have been about the same, he concluded it was just to reduce the 
costs otherwise recoverable by ten per cent.  
The defendants also argued that the fact the plaintiff failed on an alternative ground of 
claim justified a further reduction in the costs recoverable by the successful plaintiffs.  
Although acknowledging this alternative claim added some time to the trial and its 
preparation, McMurdo J said this claim was fairly arguable, and that “the general rule as 
to costs following the event should not be departed from simply because a plaintiff’s 
alternative case for a higher award is not accepted.”  
Other submissions for the defendants related to: an argument the plaintiffs did not 
ultimately have to press at trial; the service by the plaintiff of several reports of an expert 
which the plaintiffs foreshadowed would be tendered, but were not tendered; and the 
fact that one of the seven plaintiffs was entirely unsuccessful. McMurdo J was not 
persuaded that any of these grounds should impact upon the otherwise applicable costs 
orders. 
McMurdo J then considered the submissions for the successful plaintiffs that they 
should have their costs in relation to some issues raised by the defendants, most of 
them relating to allegations of contributory negligence, on the indemnity basis. His 
Honour agreed with the observations of White J in Di Carlo v Dubois [2002] QCA 225 
about the “growing practice” of seeking costs on the indemnity basis, and noted this was 
still largely explained by the “notorious divergence between costs incurred and costs 
actually recovered upon the equivalent of the standard basis”, as discussed by 
Sheppard J in Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Limited (1993) 46 FCR 225 
at 226-7.  
McMurdo J stated, however, that it was clear that an award of indemnity costs was 
exceptional, and was not to made simply because a successful party would be out of 
pocket, or because, by reference to the outcome, it could be seen that an argument 
should not have been advanced. Although some of the allegations made by the 
defendants were regarded as weak, his Honour was not persuaded that any costs 
should be awarded on the indemnity basis. 
Orders 
The orders were that the defendants pay to the first, second, third, fifth, sixth and 
seventh plaintiffs 90 per cent of their costs of the proceedings, including reserved costs, 
and that there be no order for costs between the fourth plaintiff and the defendants. 
Comment 
As clearly recognised in this judgment, it remains the position that a successful party 
should ordinarily expect that costs will be ordered in its favour, and there must be 
something exceptional about the case to warrant a departure from the general rule. 
It may be noted in that context that it was argued before the same judge in AGL Sales 
(Qld) Pty Ltd v Dawson Sales Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] QSC 75 that the plaintiff, who had 
succeeded on its principal argument but failed on several arguments, should have only 
a proportion of its costs. McMurdo J distinguished the circumstances from those in BHP. 
He said there was no suggestion that the unsuccessful arguments raised in AGL were 
advanced in bad faith or were so irrelevant to the real issues as to warrant a special 
costs order, and he concluded that the plaintiff should have all its costs. 
When, however, the court is satisfied that a departure from the usual order under r 681 
of the UCPR is justified, it appears increasingly willing to exercise the power in r 684(2) 
to declare what percentage of costs was applicable to a particular issue. A reading of 
the judgment on the substantive issues in BHP suggests the issues were so interwoven 
that any apportionment, whether by the judge or a costs assessor, was bound to be 
approximate only. An apportionment by the judge, having had the advantage of trying 
the case, avoids subjecting the parties to an expensive and time-consuming dispute to 
be resolved by a costs assessor. This approach accords with the complexities of 
modern litigation, and the philosophy of the rules as expressed in r 5 of the UCPR. 
 
 
